Changing Positions and Entrenched Polemics: A Brief History of the Association to Benefit Children\u27s Views on Pediatric HIV Testing, Counseling and Care by Crawford, Colin
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-1997
Changing Positions and Entrenched Polemics: A
Brief History of the Association to Benefit
Children's Views on Pediatric HIV Testing,
Counseling and Care
Colin Crawford
Tulane University Law School, colin.crawford@tulane.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colin Crawford, Changing Positions and Entrenched Polemics: A Brief History of the Association to Benefit Children’s Views on
Pediatric HIV Testing, Counseling and Care, 24 Fordham Urb. L.J. 729 (1997).
CHANGING POSITIONS AND ENTRENCHED
POLEMICS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
ASSOCIATION TO BENEFIT CHILDREN'S
VIEWS ON PEDIATRIC HIV TESTING,
COUNSELING, AND CARE
Colin Crawford*
Introduction
It is not, I think, false self-regard to say that the Association to
Benefit Children ("ABC") has for the better part of this decade
been one of a few parties at the center of the controversy in New
York State over the difficult and complicated issue of pediatric
HIV testing. To some extent, this was by design. I cannot say with
certainty that ABC reintroduced the issue for public consideration;
unbeknownst to us, Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn was gath-
ering support for her efforts in Albany at about the same time that
we first contacted the AIDS Institute of the New York State De-
partment of Health to revisit questions of infant HIV testing, coun-
seling and treatment. But I can say with confidence that our
participation helped generate attention on the issue, and in the
process contributed to the changes in the law about which many of
today's speakers commented.
What has not been widely recognized, I think, is that ABC's po-
sition on the issue of how and when pediatric HIV testing and
counseling should be administered changed over time. The furor
over infant HIV testing thus helped focus and refine our thinking
about crucial questions such as those surrounding confidentiality in
HIV care and medical issues connected with family, maternal and
infant health. A careful review of our changing position would
have revealed to our opponents that we were hardly the intransi-
gent zealots we were often depicted to be. Now that things have
quieted down somewhat-or, perhaps I should say, have quieted
down for the time being-with respect to this issue, this symposium
provides a useful opportunity to examine the changes in ABC's
* Special Counsel, Association to Benefit Children; Associate Professor,
Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Work on this essay was made possible in part with
support from the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Fund.
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own position over time. For this chance, ABC and I are deeply
grateful.
In my remarks today, I intend to do three things. First, I want to
document the trajectory of ABC's approach to this issue, which
was considerably more layered and nuanced than often character-
ized by the press and, certainly, by our most virulent opponents.
Second, I aim to offer some reflections as to why the debate be-
came as acrimonious as it did, and how that impeded resolution of
this issue satisfactory to the widest possible number of people.
Third, I hope that these reflections will provide a basis for some
suggestions as to how future debate on these and related, pressing
issues of family, maternal and infant health, and HIV might be-
come more civil and, in the process, achieve consensus on compel-
ling policy issues in a more efficient and humane fashion.
I. The History of ABC's Involvement
The modifications in ABC's position are revealing not only of
the need for all of us constantly to readjust our convictions when
they concern the changing realities of the HIV epidemic, but also
of the compromises all of us are forced to make in the course of
responding to such a complicated-because still imperfectly under-
stood-disease. In late 1991, I received a call from Gretchen
Buchenholz, ABC's Executive Director. Gretchen described to me
horrific situations that ABC, as a day care and foster care provider,
had recently witnessed, like that of Marsha T. Marsha was born on
Christmas Day, 1990 to a mother who was an intravenous drug
user. She was placed in foster care at birth. Like every baby in
New York State, Marsha T. was tested for HIV at birth. The re-
sults of her HIV test, however, were not shared with anyone-not
her birth mother, not her foster parents, not even her doctor or
other health care providers. Instead, Marsha's HIV test was
"blinded." This means that the test results were separated from
Marsha's medical records and used only to assist state health ex-
perts collect statistics on the spread of AIDS.
Marsha's first four months were harrowing. Less than two
months old, she developed hepatitis. A month later, she was hospi-
talized with bronchitis. The next month-April 1991-Marsha
went into respiratory arrest and was hospitalized again. Despite
her mother's drug use and that each of these illnesses taken alone
can be evidence of possible HIV-infection, it was only then, nearly
four months old, that she received an "unblinded" test for HIV.
When her positive result was confirmed, Marsha was started on
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drug trials and is now reasonably healthy, although developmen-
tally delayed as a result of the debilitating illnesses she suffered in
her precious, early months.'
Gretchen explained to me that Marsha's foster parents had faced
extraordinary obstacles in trying to have her tested, owing to New
York State's strict HIV confidentiality law. This had serious, life-
threatening implications for the life of a small child, she elabo-
rated, because many of the gravest pediatric HIV killers typically
affect children early, in their first three to six months of life.
My initial reaction to what she told me was one of shock. This
reaction, I might add, is one that I have since found to be most
common among people unfamiliar with the issue. The reason was
that it seemed incomprehensible (and still seems so to me) that
state medical authorities would test for HIV but not relay the re-
sults to the infant's parents or guardians. Gretchen further ex-
plained to me, however, that she and ABC had only in mid-1991
come to believe that it was worth challenging the strict confidenti-
ality imposed on pediatric HIV results by New York law. This was
because, she explained, new developments in pediatric HIV care
meant that infants whose HIV status was known could now have a
reasonable chance at a childhood-and maybe even an adoles-
cence beyond that.
Gretchen then went on to outline for me the opposition to her
newly-changed position.2 In brief, the problem is this: when a child
is identified as HIV-positive, so too is her mother. Some women's
rights advocates strongly oppose compulsory infant testing on the
grounds that it could be used as a tool to identify women with HIV
against their will. The feminist arguments against testing were
compounded by the fact that the majority of women with HIV are
African-American or Latina, and often quite poor. As a result,
proposals about infant HIV testing raised concerns about gender
and race-based discrimination, including possible constitutional
1. ASSOCIATION TO BENEFIT CHILDREN, A PREVENTABLE CRISIS: A SPECIAL
REPORT ON THE FAILURE TO TEST AND TREAT INFANTS AND CHILDREN FOR HIV 7-9
(1993) [hereinafter A PREVENTABLE CRISIS] (containing other examples taken from
ABC's own case files).
2. It is worth stressing that ABC had in earlier years been highly visible in its
support of voluntary, as opposed to mandatory testing. See, e.g., Stipulation and Or-
der of Settlement, Baby Angel v. Koch, 89 Civ. 4770 at paras. 13-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Baby Angel was the so-called "boarder babies" litigation that led to an end of the
practice of "boarding" newborns in New York City hospital. ABC was the institu-
tional plaintiff in the case.
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concerns about possible equal protection challenges and threats to
protected privacy interests.
As an organization, ABC constantly advocates for the poor, and
particularly poor women of color. Consequently, as Gretchen and
I spoke about it, we recognized that there was a risk in public per-
ception, if not in fact, that in taking the side of pro-testing advo-
cates we could be seen as abandoning the people we serve.
We of course knew this was not the case. As we discussed the
pros and cons of both sides, it became absolutely clear to us that,
given promising developments in pediatric HIV medical care,3 it
was absolutely essential-in the interest of prolonging and enhanc-
ing their lives as much as possible-to come out on the side of the
children and their families. Moreover, ABC's experience as a
housing provider for large, homeless families suggested that when
faced with a manageable problem, ABC's mothers tended to focus
on their well-being and that of their children.4 Thus, it was our
belief that a mother who learned of her own HIV-positive status
when her infant was identified would only want to concentrate with
more attention and devotion than ever before to her own and her
child's physical well-being. It was our view that this would include
seeking medical treatment and counseling.
From the outset, ABC insisted that our advocacy of infant test-
ing and test result disclosure was permissible only in the context of
increased funding for counseling and treatment.5 It seemed ines-
capably true to us that testing without more would be a woeful
derogation of the public duty. We have never wavered from this
conviction.6 Nonetheless, it was true that at that early stage in the
controversy-remember, again, that the year was 1991-that we
concluded that mandatory, universal infant HIV testing was the
only way to insure that no childrens' lives be needlessly lost.
Things have changed so much-and, thankfully, mostly for the bet-
ter-since 1991, that it is worth explaining why at that time we
3. First Amended Complaint, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No. 10661-95 at paras. 26-
41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (detailing some of the most promising treatments).
4. It is important to stress this point because some critics suggested that mothers
who learned that they were HIV-positive might abandon their children in despair or,
at a minimum, avoid hospital care. See, e.g., Ana Dumois, The Case Against
Mandatory Newborn Screening for HIV Antibodies, 20 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 143,
155 (1995). I have never seen any solid proof of these inflammatory claims, however.
5. A PREVENTABLE CRISIS, supra note 1 at 32-35.
6. The public record amply supports this contention. See, e.g., Colin Crawford,
An Argument for Universal Pediatric HIV, Testing, Counseling and Treatment, 3 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 33-35 (1996).
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came to the reluctant conclusion that a regime of.mandatory test-
ing was the only possible choice.
In the early 1990's, the acronyms "HIV" and "AIDS" were still
regarded by most people as a certain sentence of quick death. Dis-
crimination against people with HIV was more acute than is the
case today. Consequently, it was our view then that anything short
of mandatory testing would never be successful, and that babies'
lives would be lost in the process. People were still just too fearful
of being tested; the stigma was greater than it is today, just six
years later. If we were to advocate for the chance to give HIV-
positive infants a healthy childhood and perhaps more, it seemed
that there was no alternative to mandatory testing.
Having reached this conclusion, our next step was to contact
many of the entities most closely identified with HIV and family
health policy. Thus, I began calling everyone from officials at the
AIDS Institute to major national not-for-profits. In general, the
response I received was negative: most (like the AIDS Institute)
simply did not want to re-open what they considered to be the in-
tractable and divisive issue of pediatric HIV testing. Many
(Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, for instance) re-
sisted the suggestion of challenging any portion of New York's
strict HIV confidentiality law, appearing to me to fear that taking
out one chink in that armor would cause the entire protective
shield-one painstakingly codified in New York State's compre-
hensive AIDS confidentiality law-rapidly to disintegrate.7
However, my calls did generate interesting differences of opin-
ion. One day in the late Fall 1991, I called both the Children's
Rights Project and, in a separate call, the Gay and Lesbian Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. Unofficially, the
person I spoke to at the Children's Rights Project indicated an in-
clination to agree with ABC's emerging position favoring
mandatory testing as a way of protecting the rights of infants. The
representative of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Project, by contrast,
strongly opposed our new stance. Eventually, the ACLU officially
came out very strongly and publicly against the positions we advo-
cated.8 Nonetheless, I have never forgotten those phone calls, be-
cause they stood for me as emblematic of why this issue can
7. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993).
8. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU POSITION STATEMENT ON PRENA-
TAL AND NEWBORN HIV TESTING, reprinted in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 192, 201-205 (Robert T. Francoeur
ed., 5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter TAKING SIDES].
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become so divisive. To put it simply, the arguments in favor of
both sides are compelling for different reasons, even to people
working for the same general civil rights goals within the same or-
ganization. Any choice has some regrettable aspect.
A. ABC's Changing Position
For much of the first two years of this struggle, ABC advocated
universal mandatory testing. The reason was simple: we looked at
the available data which recorded the failure to achieve success in
getting infants tested and into treatment through maternal counsel-
ing and voluntary testing. I refer specifically to the two principal
state Department of Health-funded programs, the PCAP program
and the OB Initiative. I have in print and other public fora else-
where documented ABC's view that these programs failed, and
will not rehash here ABC's analysis of the tragically unsuccessful
voluntary testing numbers.9 Suffice it to say that our perception of
this failure was the largest single influence in shaping our position.
We were encouraged in this view, moreover, because as many as
87% of pediatric HIV cases were identified in the New York City
metropolitan area.
In addition, I should note that our initial position was strongly
influenced by the fact that New York City and State social service
agencies had failed adequately to address the needs for testing and
treatment of children in foster care. This moved us, as a foster care
provider and an agency that worked with a large number of chil-
dren in foster care, to believe that prompt, mandatory testing was
the only acceptable alternative.
B. ABC's Foster Care Challenge
Our initial conversations with the AIDS Institute made it clear
that it would not review its pediatric testing policy until it was con-
9. See, e.g., Colin Crawford, Protecting the Weakest Link: A Proposal for Univer-
sal, Unblinded Pediatric HIV Testing, Counseling and Treatment, 20 J. COMMUNITY
HEALTH 125, 129-131 (1995), reprinted in TAKING SIDES, supra note 8 at 194-200. It is
worth noting that this conclusion is drawn from the Department of Health's own sta-
tistics, which document the failure of its voluntary testing programs. For instance, in
one state-funded survey for the period July 1-September 30, 1993, out of a docu-
mented 228 newborns born in New York State who tested positive for HIV, 27 were
successfully counseled, tested and identified for treatment in state-sponsored pro-
grams. That is a success rate of 15.9%. These statistics were taken from a chart pre-
pared by the Department of Health (on file with the author).
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vinced that the medical landscape had changed significantly.' 0
ABC strongly believed that the foster care portion of the pediatric
HIV problem needed especially prompt attention because it was
estimated by early 1993 that 50-60% of children in foster care were
HIV-positive, a grim reality that ABC knew only too well from its
experience as a foster care provider.11
The foster care crisis led us to contemplate the first of several
lawsuits we considered over the course of our involvement in this
controversy. We began, first, from a premise that we believed was
supported by both the United States and New York State constitu-
tions. To be specific, in consultation with pro bono counsel, we
concluded that basic duties of care for the health and well being of
New York's youngest citizens had been and continued to be
breached by the executive branch agencies charged with protecting
them.1 2
Our concerns about the inadequacy of the foster care testing
procedures focused particularly on three issues. First, we were dis-
turbed that the process of getting a child in foster care tested could
take several months while the foster care provider went through
the cumbersome procedures required to identify the parent or legal
guardian of a child in foster care. Second, we wondered why the
obligation to test children in foster care extended only to a child's
second year. Presumably, to protect all children's health, it was
essential to have some mechanism to test all children until they had
the capacity to consent for themselves. Third, it was our view that
it was crucial to screen all children in foster care for risk factors, in
order to indicate when a child urgently needed an HIV test, as the
first step in identifying threatened children for special care and
treatment. This last view, it should be added, was directly in-
formed by New York City Child Welfare Administration ("CWA")
policies. 3
10. 1 refer specifically to the principles articulated by the Aids Institute at the
January, 1990 Mohunk Conference. See A PREVENTABLE CRISIS, supra note 1, at 23-
24.
11. See Crawford, supra note 9, at 131-134.
12. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 36-37.
13. This is indicated, for example, by the Notice of Emergency Adoption and Pro-
posed Rule Making issued on September 2, 1994 by the New York State Department
of Social Services, proposing changed procedures for identifying children with HIV in
foster care. The advisory notes that affected agencies were required to include:
documentation that the child in foster care has been assessed for risk factors
related to HIV infection in accordance with section 441.22(b) of this Title
[meaning the state Public Health Law], and, if one or more risk factors have
been identified, a description of the procedures that were followed to ar-
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As has been the case throughout the pediatric HIV controversy,
our initial approach was to work for change by trying to convince
the state Commissioners of Social Services and Health to initiate
public review of the issue. When that approach failed, we resorted
to the blunt tool of litigation, going so far as to prepare a complaint
naming then-Governor Cuomo and his Commissioners in a suit al-
leging their nonfeasance of constitutionally-directed and other re-
sponsibilities. Fortunately, days before we filed suit, the
Commissioner of Social Services recognized the strength of our
case and, on June 6, 1994, issued on an emergency basis, new regu-
lations for children in foster care. The regulations addressed each
of our concerns: (1) streamlined procedures so that, especially in
emergency situations, a child could be tested after good faith ef-
forts were made to identify the parent or legal guardian; (2) the
extension of the testing period beyond age two to "capacity to con-
sent";' 4 and (3) adoption by regulation of substantially the same
list of risk factors that would direct medical professionals to con-
duct an HIV test as that used by the New York City CWA.15
Within less than three months, Department of Social Services
("DSS") Commissioner Michael Dowling issued emergency regula-
tions formalizing these requirements.' 6 To our delight, not only
range for appropriate HIV-related testing including obtaining the necessary
written informed consent for such testing ....
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, NOTICE OF EMERGENCY ADOPTION
AND PROPOSED RULE MAKING (Sept. 2, 1994) (copy on file with author).
14. In preparing this lawsuit, ABC arrived at the conclusion that the phrase "ca-
pacity to consent" was open to interpretation as a matter of law, and could mean
anyone from a pre-adolescent able to understand his/her rights to a young adult as old
as 17 or 18. However, because our focus was on infants and very young children, we
did not object to the phrase.
15. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kathryn Croft, Executive Deputy Commissioner,
Child Welfare Administration of the Human Resources Administration, City of New
York, to heads of foster care and related agencies (Sept. 13, 1994) (on file with the
author). The memorandum states:
This LCM is to inform you that [DSS] will now build on the CWA experi-
ence and develop statewide requirements to ensure that all New York foster
children who may be HIV-infected are provided with the advantage of early
diagnosis and treatment. [DSS] will develop regulations and guidelines re-
quiring that all foster children, without regard to age, be screened on the
basis of a specified list of risk factors within five working days of entry into
foster care .... If the assessment identified one or more risk factors, desig-
nated social service staff are to be informed immediately so that steps neces-
sary to secure an HIV test may be completed no later than 30 days after the
child's entry into foster care.
Id.
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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were the regulations issued with relative speed, but the relevant
agencies acted quickly to implement them.17
From ABC's point of view, these changed regulations consti-
tuted an important but partial victory. We remained convinced
that the foster care part of the pediatric HIV testing problem was
only the most glaring example of how earlier policy had failed. We
continued to believe that all children, including those not in foster
care, needed to be served. Consequently, we considered next how
to translate the foster care victory into a larger one benefitting all
of the state's children.
Then a crucial, unanticipated event occurred that, inadvertently,
moved the struggle in an entirely new direction. In November
1994, George Pataki was elected Governor. Quickly after taking
office, on January 6, 1995, in keeping a campaign promise to cut
down on the size and reach of government, Governor Pataki issued
an Executive Order 8 that placed a moratorium on the promulga-
tion of any new regulations. Because DSS issued the pediatric
HIV foster care regulations on an emergency basis, thus requiring
further notice and comment, they were covered by the moratorium
order. Our achievements with respect to the new foster care pedi-
atric HIV testing regulations had suddenly and unexpectedly been
put on hold, imperiling the efforts of the previous four years.
The Governor's regulatory moratorium forced us to undergo a
thorough reconsideration of our position-and our options. In
fact, with one fell swoop, the Governor's act forced us to reevalu-
ate our entire position. Also, because all that we worked for had
so suddenly been threatened, we also became convinced that we
were compelled to act quickly.
C. ABC's Lawsuit on Behalf of All Children with HIV in New
York
On March 15, 1995, a group of plaintiffs consisting of numerous
children and their mothers or natural guardians, ABC's Executive
Director, Gretchen Buchenholz, as guardian ad litem, and ABC
filed suit against Governor Pataki, Mary Glass, his Commissioner
of Social Services, and Barbara DeBuono, his Commissioner of
Health, for violations of the New York Social Services and Public
Health Laws, the New York State Constitution, and the Due Pro-
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18. Kevin Sack, New York's New Governor: The Overview; Pataki Promises a Re-
duced Budget and Lower Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at Al.
1997] 737
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cess and Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution.
This lawsuit set in motion what in retrospect appeared, from
ABC's perspective, to be the most crucial seven months of our or-
ganization's entire effort on this issue. ABC was convinced that it
was necessary to take some action that would compel the Gover-
nor to lift his moratorium, and also to address the problem of all
children at risk of HIV. The relief sought in the lawsuit was simple:
(1) a declaration that defendants violated the laws mentioned
above, and (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions compelling
defendants to provide for routine HIV testing for all newborns in
New York and, where appropriate, treatment and counseling for
HIV positive infants, their mothers and other family members and
caregivers. a9 It is worth adding that our conviction in the appropri-
ateness of bringing this lawsuit was supported by increasing medi-
cal evidence on the value of early testing.2° Throughout the
ensuing, turbulent months, further information demonstrated the
wisdom of our choice, including news from the state's own Depart-
ment of Health that the exceptionally precise polymerase chain re-
action ("PCR") HIV test (which tests DNA) would be available at
no cost for pediatric HIV tests. 21 Because of its low false positive
rate, the PCR was an especially reliable test in that it allowed med-
ical professionals to determine with much greater accuracy than
ever before those children with actual HIV, rather than those who
carried maternal HIV antibodies that they would later shed.
1. Defendants-Intervenors
Perhaps the oddest development of these months was the oppo-
sition to ABC's efforts by people who most benefitted from our
approach. I refer specifically to the intervention on the side of the
state defendants of the HIV Law Project, with support from other
AIDS advocacy organizations.2 3 Despite the fact that ABC staff
19. Baby Girl v. Pataki, No. 106691-95 at pp. 28-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
20. Id. at paras. 35-36 (citing studies from the American Academy of Pediatrics
and the Federal Centers for Disease Control).
21. Letter from Barbara A. DeBuono, M.D., M.P.H., State Commissioner of
Health and Louis Cooper, M.D., Chairperson, District II American Academy of Pedi-
atrics to Medical Health Professionals (Apr., 1995) (detailing availability of PCR tests
as a diagnostic tool) (copy on file with the author).
22. Id. (reporting that "[d]espite past concerns about the specificity of PCR tests,
the Laboratory's rate for false positives was very low (three out of 1,500 specimens or
0.2 percent)").
23. See Reply Affirmation of Theresa M. McGovern, Baby Girl v. Pataki, No.
10661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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worked before with some of the HIV Law Project's colleagues and
supporters on this issue, our organization was never contacted
before the HIV Law Project commenced a vitriolic campaign
against ABC, both in court and in the popular press.
On behalf of some of its clients who, it contended, would be ad-
versely affected by the result we sought in our lawsuit, the HIV
Law Project intervened."4 As Defendants-Intervenors, the HIV
Law Project thus entered the lawsuit on the side of New York
State, opposing any suggested change of the HIV testing law. In
addition, during this period ABC became the target of other, less
appropriate criticism, much of it levied against us from anonymous
sources who made unsubstantiated attacks on our motives. My
point in mentioning these unpleasant antics is more, however, than
a footnote for the historical record. On the contrary, the response
of the Defendants-Intervenors and our other, unidentified critics,
was notable because it underscored a central theme of this essay,
namely the unwillingness of people in the HIV/AIDS activist com-
munity to depart-however briefly-from their entrenched posi-
tions to study our proposal. Specifically, I refer to the fact that our
complaint sought testing only if paired with counseling and treat-
ment.25 In retrospect, it is difficult not to speculate that in their
heart of hearts some of our fiercest opponents now wish that they
sided with our intermediate position, since the compromise posi-
tion we reached surely now must seem to them preferable to the
mandatory testing plan that subsequently became law. At a mini-
mum, it is true that the multi-faceted approach we sought to imple-
ment provided a common ground for discussion, unlike the pro-
testing bill then making the rounds inAlbany, which did not make
increased counseling a precondition for mandatory testing, and
only directed additional care appropriations of five million
dollars. 6
24. See, e.g., Defendants-Intervenors' Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
Vacatur of the Stipulation or, in the Alternative, Leave to Assert Additional Claims,
Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki No. 106661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
25. Baby Girl v. Pataki, No. 10661-95 at pp. 28-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
26. The draft of Assembly Bill 6747B, for the 1994 New York legislative session,
proposed, in relevant part, the following amendment to Subdivision (f), of section 56
of chapter 731 of the laws of 1993: "five million dollars [for a special program for HIV
services for infants and pregnant women] to establish special programs for the assist-
ance of any child testing positive at birth for HIV and the members of such child's
family .... " [emphasis in original] (on file with the author).
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2. The Lawsuit is Settled
In early September 1995, shortly after Labor Day, ABC's superb
pro bono counsel for this dispute27 received a call from the state
Attorney General's office. The caller informed us that after a seri-
ous review of the matter, the Attorney General wished to seek a
settlement of this matter. The settlement, while forcing each side
to cede ground, was unarguably the most significant event in
ABC's five-year battle on this issue.
The settlement also represented the most drastic revision of our
position. As provided in the Stipulation of Settlement,28 the state
Defendants provided that they would issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking "concerning the testing of newborns pursuant to Pub-
lic Health Law Sec. 2500-a [which details the duties of the Depart-
ment of Health] and not inconsistent with Public Health Law Art.
27-F [the HIV/AIDS confidentiality provisions] . "...29 Impor-
tantly, too, the state Defendants agreed to issue such Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking "providing that hospitals and other health
care institutions covered by Public Health Law Art. 28 shall coun-
sel all pregnant women seeking prenatal care about the health ben-
efits of an HIV test, consistent with the requirements of Public
Health Law Section 2781(2). "30 This last provision was of crucial
importance to ABC and the population it served. As our Execu-
tive Director is fond of saying, it represented a "beautiful compro-
mise" because it protected confidentiality while also recognizing
the imperative of insuring prompt access for infants and children
with HIV and AIDS to life-saving medical care.
A revision of the state's "Informed Consent" form used for HIV
testing addressed the counseling provided for in the stipulation. 31
The revised informed consent testing form applied only to mothers
of newborns, and was to work as follows. Mothers of newborns
would, soon after birth, be informed that their children were tested
at birth for HIV, just as newborns are routinely tested for a
number of common neonatal diseases. They would also be in-
formed, in accordance with the confidentiality law and standard
27. ABC's counsel were Margaret Keane and John Kinzey of the Manhattan law
firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae. See Vera Titunik, Forcing a "Beautiful
Compromise" on Infant HIV Testing, The Am. Law., Dec. 1995, at 34 (describing
ABC's work with LeBoeuf, Lamb et al. as pro bono counsel).
28. Stipulation, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No. 10661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The existing form appears in N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63.10
(1995).
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medical procedures designed to protect patient privacy, that paren-
tal consent was required to disclose test results. The form's design
advised the new parents of the possible benefits and risks of know-
ing the child's HIV status. Following these disclosures, the neona-
tal informed consent form then required a mother to choose
whether she agreed to have the results of an HIV test on her child
disclosed to her or not.
Although this proposal meant that ABC would no longer adhere
to a program of mandatory testing, counseling, and treatment, it
did serve, in our view, an important goal. Specifically, the revised
consent form would do what had not been done previously,
namely, inform mothers that their children would be tested, and
compel them to examine the consequences of choosing not to learn
their children's test results. As an organization, it has long been
ABC's experience that a mother, even one in extremely distressed
conditions, will almost invariably take the necessary steps to focus
on the health and well being of her child and thus also herself. The
revised informed consent form for use in the neonatal context
would, we therefore hoped, lead to such a result. That is, we be-
lieved that most mothers would opt to learn the test results, and
take advantage of the best available treatment for themselves and
their children if they learned they were HIV-positive.
3. Results of Settlement Prove to be Effective
In fact, our speculations proved true. During the presentation
for this panel of Dr. Wendy Chavkin, of the Columbia University
School of Public Health, Dr. Chavkin quoted statistics of a success-
ful informed consent testing rate of 96% following implementation
of the post-settlement, voluntary testing with a mandatory in-
formed consent form.32 The revised, post-settlement consent form
asked a mother (or legal guardian) to choose whether she wanted
to learn the result of her child's HIV test or not. That is, a mother
was asked simply to say "YES" or "NO", after receiving the re-
quired information about informed consent principles and a brief
indication of the merits of and potential problems posed by an
HIV-positive test result.
32. Telephone interview with Deborah Ellman, Research Assistant to Dr. Wendy
Chavkin (Apr. 8, 1997). Deborah Ellman heard Dr. Kenneth Pass, head of the Wad-
sworth Laboratories (which performs all of the state's HIV testing and data collec-
tion) quote this statistic at a public presentation on HIV screening at the annual
meeting of the American Public Health Association, in New York, in November 1996.
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In addition, the plan envisaged by the settlement looked forward
to what would happen in the event that a mother declined to sign
the revised informed consent form at all. If a medical care pro-
vider had cause to believe in a strong likelihood that the child and
his or her mother were infected with HIV, and the mother had not
signed the informed consent one way or the other, the doctor could
declare a medical emergency and direct that a test be done so that
care could promptly be delivered to the child. It was this sugges-
tion-that certain situations required declaration of a medical
emergency sufficient to conduct a non-consensual test-that
proved the most troublesome for ABC as we went through the no-
tice and comment period on the proposed regulations.33 Again, we
endured attacks in this connection suggesting that this would lead
to wide-scale, unrestrained witch hunts of potentially HIV-positive
mothers.
4. Opposition to the Settlement
The opposition to the settlement on the part of the Defendants-
Intervenors was fast and furious. On October 10, 1995, a press
conference was held at one of ABC's facilities. Governor Pataki,
flanked by Attorney General Dennis Vacco and state Health Com-
mission Barbara DeBuono, announced the terms of the settlement.
Outside, protestors from the HIV Law Project marched in opposi-
tion, carrying placards that not only opposed the terms of the set-
tlement, but also (and again) questioned our motives.
The Stipulation of Settlement was filed with the court that day.
Over the next two months, the Defendants-Intervenors filed nu-
merous briefs and affidavits with the court, seeking judicial disap-
proval of the Stipulation of Settlement. Although their claims
need not be rehashed here, it is fair to say that the principal com-
plaint was that Defendants-Intervenors should have been brought
into the settlement process. 34 It was ABC's position, however, that
this was not required since the settlement provided only that a No-
33. See, e.g., Letter from Theresa M. McGovern, HIV Law Project and Virginia
Shubert, Housing Works, Inc. to Judge William Davis (Oct. 9, 1995) (stating that
"[tlhe judgment as to which women fit these criteria appears to be completely subjec-
tive, thereby ensuring that low income women will be the ones denied the right to
control this information"). Similar comments followed throughout .the notice and
comment period.
34. See, e.g., Defendants-Intervenors' Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
Vacatur of the Stipulation or, in the Alternative, Leave to Assert Additional Claims at
20, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No. 10661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (arguing that because
the public interest was directly involved, the Defendant-Intervenors were entitled to
an opportunity to be heard prior to the approval of the Stipulation of Settlement).
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tice of Proposed Rulemaking would be issued. This Notice pro-
vides for extensive public notice and comment on the new
regulations, so that no party's special interest will be compromised
by virtue of settling the lawsuit.
Of the invective hurled during this period, from ABC's perspec-
tive none was stranger than the suggestion of a conspiracy to freeze
the Defendants-Intervenors out of negotiations. Indeed, it was
their view that "New York State Assemblywoman Nettie Mayer-
sohn was an active participant in settlement negotiations. '35 This
allegation was, to the best of ABC's knowledge, completely base-
less. Once again, however, it is highly suggestive of the extremely
regrettable climate of distrust and hostility that developed around
this issue. What is most unfortunate about this environment of sus-
picion is that it prevented people who shared the same general
goal-the best provision of HIV/AIDS medical care available
while also protecting individual liberties to the greatest possible ex-
tent-from working together to find a consensus.
5. The Stipulation of Settlement is Approved
Happily for ABC, Justice William J. Davis of the Supreme Court
of New York agreed with our position. In an opinion rendered De-
cember 29, 1995, Justice Davis concluded that while AIDS:
is the plague of this century.... [t]his court... is not the proper
venue to determine the issue at hand, which has now become:
(1) a political question that has and is being presently being de-
bated and scrutinized by both the executive and legislative
branches of government . . ., and; (2) the subject matter of pro-
posed administrative rulings under the State Administrative
Procedures Act (SAPA).36
Justice Davis pointedly added that the Defendants-Intervenors
contentions were:
Defendants-Intervenors subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal in this case, dated De-
cember 15, 1995.
35. Reply Affirmation of Theresa M. McGovern, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No.
10661-95 at para. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In fact, ABC, although broadly sympathetic
with Assemblywoman Nerrie Mayersohn's goals and admiring of her energy on behalf
of infants with HIV and AIDS, disagreed with her approach to the extent that it did
not provide sufficient guarantees of money for counseling and treatment. This criti-
cism of her bill was widespread. See, e.g., Kevin J. Curran, Note, Newborn HIV
Screening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy and Equal Protection of
Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 883-886 (1994).
36. Reply Affirmation of Theresa M. McGovern, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No.
10661-95 at para. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
19971]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
of no moment. The defendants-intervenors have no legal basis
for objecting to plaintiffs' voluntary discontinuance of this ac-
tion .... The stipulation for voluntary discontinuance was 'so
ordered' in view of the little litigation among the parties, cou-
pled with the fact that no substantial rights of the defendants-
intervenors accrued at the time of the stipulation, and the ab-
sence of any prejudice to the defendants-intervenors.37
II. The Fruit of ABC's Efforts
Following the stipulation, the Department of Health promptly
issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.38 The proposed rule
change was simple in language but powerful in potential impact. It
proposed an amendment of Section 98.2 of Title 10 of the New
York State rules and regulations, to read as follows (the proposed
changes are italicized):
(c) Comprehensive health service means all those health serv-
ices which an enrolled population might require to be main-
tained in good health, and shall include, but shall not be limited
to, physician services... inpatient and outpatient hospital serv-
ices, diagnostic laboratory and therapeutic and diagnostic radio-
logic services, and emergency preventive health services,
including providing HIV counseling and recommending volun-
tary HIV testing to pregnant women, which counseling and testing
shall be conducted pursuant to Public Health Law Article 27-F,
referring HIV positive persons for necessary, clinically appropri-
ate services, and including service required under Article 43 of
the Insurance Law....
The new regulations went into effect, in final form, in April, 1996.
Even before then, however, the expected change in the law led to
adoption of related rules, all designed both to ensure confidential-
ity and seek testing so that, where appropriate, prompt, effective
treatment for HIV/AIDS could be made available to mothers and
their children.40 As indicated above, the regulations, with their sys-
tem of voluntary testing following a compelled choice either to
37. Id. at paras. 4-5.
38. Letter from Lucia M. Valente, Chief Special Counsel to the Attorney General,
to Margaret Keane, Esq. (Dec. 11, 1995) (informing ABC that the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking had been sent for publication in the State Register).
39. Id. (copy of proposed draft regulation on file with the author).
40. See, e.g., Memorandum from Claudette LaMelle, Director, Pediatric AIDS
Unit & Hospital Baby Project, Administration for Children's Services, City of New
York, to Voluntary Child Care Agencies, Field Office Directors and PAU Liaisons
(Apr. 11, 1996) (describing new regulations for treating children in foster care) (on
file with the author).
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learn the results or not, appears to have been a tremendous suc-
cess, a fact now celebrated by many of those who long opposed
every step we took on this issue.4 As subsequent events demon-
strated, it is, to say the least, regrettable that the HIV Law Project
and others refused at an earlier stage seriously to consider the re-
vised informed consent proposals. From every point of view,
ABC's proposals represented a compromise that balanced the con-
cerns of all parties to the debate more fairly than did the proce-
dures that replaced them.
To be precise, the regulations failed to last long. In the 1996 leg-
islative session, Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn again intro-
duced her so-called "Baby AIDS" bill, and by June 26, 1996, the
state legislature passed it and Governor Pataki signed it.42 Assem-
blywoman Mayersohn's bill implemented a mandatory testing
scheme.43 By October 16, 1996, the New York State Register pub-
lished proposed regulations designed to implement the terms of
Assemblywoman Mayersohn's bill.4 It is sadly ironic that many
advocacy organizations that once opposed ABC's efforts suddenly
found themselves pleading with state health regulators not to im-
plement the mandatory testing regime because "[t]he voluntary
testing program has only been in place for six months, and has not
been evaluated for its efficiency. '4" The regulations implementing
Assemblywoman Mayersohn's bill did, however, go into effect, on
41. Stipulation, Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No. 10661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
42. Letter from Nettie Mayersohn, Member of Assembly, State of New York to
Gretchen Buchenholz, Executive Director, Association to Benefit Children (July 26,
1996) (on file with the author). See also Governor George Pataki, Executive Memo-
randum relating to Ch. 220, HIV testing of Newborns-Testing for Antibodies to HIV
in Newborns, 1996 N.Y. Laws 220 (McKinney 1996).
43. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney 1997).
44. N.Y. St. Reg., October 16, 1996, at 33.
45. Letter from Cynthia Schneider, HIV Unit Director, & Kristin Bebelaar, Law
Graduate, Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B, to William R. Johnson, Department of
Health, Bureau of Management Analysis 3-4 (Nov. 27, 1996) (on file with the author).
See also THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, Comment on Maternal
Pediatric HIV Prevention and Care Program, 51 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 826, 828 (Dec. 1996). The comment states:
The Department of Health implemented regulations in May 1996 to en-
courage women to learn the results of the newborn HIV screening con-
ducted by the State. This program has been in place for only six months and,
to our knowledge, the State has not undertaken a comprehensive study to
determine the success of this program both in identifying HIV-infected
newborns and ensuring that they and their mothers receive appropriate
HIV-related medical care.
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February 1, 1997.46 Although legal challenges to this rule are quite
possible, it is true-and regrettable-that the "beautiful compro-
mise" of an option that successfully balanced confidentiality rights
against public health and HIV/AIDS pediatric treatment needs was
not given a chance to succeed, this time because Assemblywoman
Mayersohn remained wedded to her insistence on mandatory
testing.47
III. Conclusions: What Lessons Does This Controversy Teach?
Even allowing that hindsight provides clarity often unavailable
in the heat of a protracted battle over an important social policy
issue, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about what
this experience teaches. First and foremost, the debate over infant
HIV testing indicates the need for advocacy organizations always
to seek common ground. As the above history suggests, too much
time and effort was expended-not to mention the bad will that
was created-either fighting for turf or, even worse, failing to listen
to what the different parties were saying. I do not here, I should
stress, mean to put ABC up on a pedestal. It certainly might be
suggested, for example, that we could have considered the possibil-
ity of voluntary testing following a compelled choice either to learn
the results or not, far earlier than we did. We could have come to
this realization, moreover, from working even harder than we did
to try and accommodate the confidentiality and civil liberties con-
cerns of our opponents. At the same time, however, the pediatric
HIV testing debate revealed to my mind the intransigence of many
not-for-profits in the face of changing information and new treat-
ment methods for the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 8
To put it simply, the debate starkly revealed how much many
HIV/AIDS service organizations continue to live in a culture of
46. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, H.I.V. Testing for Newborns Debated Anew, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb.10, 1997, at Al.
47. It should be added, however, that changes in federal HIV/AIDS law perhaps
rendered Assemblywoman Mayersohn's efforts redundant to the extent that they tied
federal grant monies to prenatal counseling and testing. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34
(West 1996). See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300ff-21, 300ff-35, 300ff-71, and 300ff-73 (West
1996).
48. One important treatment development not addressed in this essay, but one
that may in the long term have a significant effect on the proper policy approach to
and regulation of this issue, is the administration of zidovudine (AZT) to pregnant
mothers as a method of reducing the risk of maternal to infant HIV transmission. See,
e.g., Rhoda S. Sperling et al., Maternal Viral Load, Zidovudine Treatment, and the
Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I From Mother to In-
fant, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621 (1996).
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fear and suspicion more appropriate in the early years of the epi-
demic than today. Regrettably, it is my further view that by failing
to move beyond the past when such suspicion was more warranted
than is now the case, these advocates may, inadvertently, end up
encouraging yet further secretiveness and suspicion, indirectly
helping to keep public discussion of the realities of HIV and AIDS
underground. This is not to minimize valuable and sometimes he-
roic work by HIV/AIDS advocates. It is merely to suggest that
policymaking requires flexibility, and that as treatment changes, so
do the social risks for people with HIV and AIDS. This directs, in
turn, the need to reconsider views-such as opposition to any form
of mandatory testing-that may once have been absolutely
appropriate.
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